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I.

Introduction
Following the emancipation of slaves in the State of Maryland, pursuant to the 1864

Maryland Constitution, many black families sought to attain the promise of freedom and selfautonomy.

Intrinsic to the goal of liberty was the understanding that until black families

possessed the absolute legal right to their children, then complete liberation from the “badges
and incidents of slavery” 1 could not occur. However, in an attempt to maintain control of their
former slaves, slave owners would assign themselves their formers slaves as apprentices, all
under the guise of a legal indenture contract.

As a result, many Maryland black parents

petitioned the various county orphans’ courts and the Baltimore City Criminal Court to have
their children released from the labor contracts and returned to their families. One such parent
was Leah Coston (hereinafter “LC”) 2, whose children, Simon and Washington Coston, were
bound to their former master, Samuel S. Costen (hereinafter “SSC”), as apprentices.
Contextually, the case of Coston v. Coston represents an opportunity to reconstruct the
legal history surrounding the common practice of binding former slave children as apprentices in
Reconstruction Maryland. Moreover, this form of apprenticeship was particularly unique to the
State of Maryland because of the strong tradition of slavery in the state, despite remaining loyal
to the Union during the Civil War. Ultimately, the practice of forced apprenticeship would come
to a sudden halt when Chief Justice Salmon P. Chase of the Supreme Court of the United States

1

Civil Rights Cases, 100 U.S. 1, 20 (1883).
It was traditional for many slaves to take the last names of their former masters. However, it was also
commonplace for variations of spelling due to the fact that many times names were relayed orally, and as a result,
various spellings of a common last name emerged. For purposes of this paper, I intend to use the last name
“Coston” for Leah, Simon, and Washington, and the last name “Costen” to refer to Samuel S. Costen and the Costen
family. Whether intentional or not, Leah Coston adopted the last name Coston, perhaps as a means of separating
herself from her slave past, or perhaps through a clerical misspelling. The caption of the central case-study which I
will examine infra reads “Coston v. Coston,” which I infer was the result of Leah Coston and her lawyers filing the
petition. This distinction should be noted to honor the history of both Leah Coston and the Costen family. I thank
Dr. Edward C. Papenfuse and Professor Garrett Power for bringing this point to my attention.
2
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decided a case that turned post-emancipation apprenticeship on its head. Thus, the chance to
examine the specific case of Coston v. Coston present a unique legal history opportunity. The
case of Coston v. Coston ultimately embodies common apprenticeship practices in Maryland at
the time, as the last vestiges of slavery were targeted and removed through the close working
relationship and carefully crafted litigation strategy of Leah Coston’s radical lawyers.

II.

HISTORICAL CONTEXT
A. The Lead up to Coston v. Coston
Ratification for the Maryland Constitution of 1864 was solidified on November 1, 1864,

thereby freeing all those still enslaved in the state of Maryland. However, despite the guarantees
of freedom contained in the new constitution, thousands of newly freed children were quickly
apprenticed to their former masters. 3 Shortly after ratification, a Boston newspaper ran an article
characterizing Maryland as “Free State!” but warned that “some of the slaveholders mean to hold
on to their ‘people,’ in order to test the legality of emancipation before the courts.” 4 Indeed,
unwilling to simply turn over free labor, slave owners sought shelter under Maryland’s
apprenticeship laws in order to maintain control over newly freed black minors.

3

Art. 24 Md. Const.. Because Maryland was a border state that remained loyal to the Union during the Civil War,
President Lincoln’s Emancipation Proclamation in 1862 did not affect the state of Maryland. Accordingly, it
required state law to outlaw slavery. Interestingly, when first tallied, the Maryland Constitution failed ratification.
However, after counting absentee Union soldier votes, Article 24 was ratified by a mere 375 votes. See infra note 5.
4
This citation is from a Boston newspaper following ratification of the Maryland Constitution of 1864. This
newspaper clipping was distributed in class, but I have been unable to find the full citation myself.

4
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The resulting apprenticeship of newly freed black children was almost immediate.
According to Richard Paul Fuke (hereinafter “Fuke”), “[w]ithin days of emancipation, Maryland
planters and farmers seized the labor of some three thousand black minors under the provisions
of an unrepealed section of the state’s black code.” 6 Fields highlights the “rush to apprentice the
freedmen’s children” the adoption of the new constitution. 7 Estimates suggest that between
3,000 and 4,000 black children were forced into labor contracts as apprentices, 8 although
Barbara Fields suggests that 2,519 children were apprenticed. 9 In the case of In re Turner,

5

MARYLAND STATE ARCHIVES,
http://www.msa.md.gov/msa/speccol/sc5600/sc5604/2004/november/html/appendix.html (last visited Oct. 17,
2011).
6
RICHARD PAUL FUKE, IMPERFECT EQUALITY: AFRICAN AMERICANS AND THE CONFINES OF WHITE RACIAL
ATTITUDES IN POST-EMANCIPATION MARYLAND, 70 (1999); see also JOSEPH A. RANNEY, IN THE WAKE OF SLAVERY:
CIVIL WAR, CIVIL RIGHTS, AND THE RECONSTRUCTION OF SOUTHERN LAW, 48 (2006).
7
BARBARA JEANNE FIELDS, SLAVERY AND FREEDOM ON THE MIDDLE GROUND: MARYLAND DURING THE
NINETEENTH CENTURY, 148 (1985).
8
FUKE, supra note 6, at 83, n. 12.
9
FIELDS, supra note 7, at 153.
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which I will discuss infra, 10 Chief Justice Chase observed that “[a]lmost immediately . . . many
of the freed people of Talbot county were collected together under some authority . . . and the
younger persons were bound as apprentices, usually, if not always, to their late masters.”11
Indeed, it appears that Elizabeth Turner, the apprenticed child in In re Turner, was apprenticed
just “two days after the new constitution went into operation.” 12
The “Black Codes” mentioned above refer to the 1860 Maryland Code of Public General
Laws. 13 Fields argues that the “Black Codes” helped former masters “cope with the reality of
emancipation” and notes that the use of the Codes for Reconstruction apprenticing was meant to
be “transitional.” 14 The Code directed local sheriffs and constables to “bring the child of any
free negro before” the county orphans’ court where the orphans’ court would determine whether
the “parent or parents have the means and are willing to support [the] child.” 15 Thus, the “Black
Codes” were the principle instrument by which slave owners maintained custody of their free
child labor.
Unfortunately for many freed black families, many orphans’ courts construed the term
“means” rather narrowly, and thus typically limited this threshold determination of “means” to
the parents’ “pecuniary ability.” 16 Accordingly, the judges of the orphans’ court would often
award apprentices to their former masters notwithstanding the more intangible “means” that
natural parents possess. Generally, where the parents were present and were able to demonstrate

10

See infra Part IV.
In re Turner, 24 F.Cas. 337, 339 (C.C. Md. 1867).
12
Id.
13
Volume 175 Maryland Code of Public General Laws, Art. 6, §§ 31-39 pp. 38-39, available at Maryland State
Archives, http://www.aomol.net/megafile/msa/speccol/sc2900/sc2908/000001/000145/html/index.html (last visited
Oct. 27, 2011).
14
FIELDS, supra note 7, at 153.
15
Volume 175 Maryland Code of Public General Laws, Art. 6, §§ 32-33, p. 38, available at Maryland State
Archives, http://www.aomol.net/megafile/msa/speccol/sc2900/sc2908/000001/000145/html/index.html (last visited
Oct. 27, 2011).
16
FUKE, supra note 6, at 78. (Citing BALTIMORE AMERICAN, Jan. 18, 1865)
11
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the “means” with which to care for their children, the orphans’ court would grant custody to the
parent. However, where the parents were absent during the orphan proceedings, or where
parents were unable to demonstrate the “means” to parent, the minors would often be
apprenticed to their former slave owners. 17
Frequently, these freed black children would enter into labor contracts. 18 These contracts
legally bound the minors to their former slaveholders for a fixed period of time. The indenture
contracts could not be annulled, however, absent “evidence of cruel and inhuman treatment.” 19
Another factor going into the consideration of the apprenticeship contracts was that some parents
willfully consented to their children being apprenticed. 20 However, given the necessities of labor
for a productive rural life, it is unlikely that many of these parents did willfully consent to the
bindings.

17

RANNEY, supra note 6, at 48.
See infra note 21.
19
FIELDS, supra note 7, at 154.
20
Margaret A. Burnham, Property, Parenthood, and Peonage: Reflections on the Return to Status Quo Antebellum,
18 CARDOZO L. REV. 433, 441 (1996).
18
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21

In many instances, the orphans’ courts failed to recognize (and it appears did not
consider) that freed children were critical for former slaves to escape “the badges and incidents
of slavery.” Human capital in the form of child labor was crucial for freed blacks. 22 Both in
terms of legal self-autonomy, and in terms of needing human capital to produce a livelihood in
the mid-nineteenth century, children of freed slaves were intrinsic to families wishing to create a
new life outside the bondage of slavery. With the help of both the federal government and the
help of local politicians and lawyers, parents were increasingly able to secure the release of their
children.

21
22

FUKE, supra note 6, Indenture Papers, 1864.
See FUKE, supra note 6, at 70.
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B. Efforts to Dispose of Apprenticeship
There were two primary driving forces behind the efforts to secure the release of
apprentices from their former masters. First, the creation of the federal Freedmen’s Bureau
established a top-down federal effort to abolish the vestiges of slavery and provide on-theground enforcement of the newly enacted constitutional provisions. Additionally, local lawyers
and politicians provided the institutional and legal framework with which to free apprentices.
With regards to the Freedmen’s Bureau, Fuke explains that “[t]he anti-apprenticeship
campaign received a major boost in 1866, when the Freedmen’s Bureau lent its full weight to the
cause.” 23 The Freedmen’s Bureau was created by Congress in March 1865 and was assigned to
fall under the purview of the War Department and “[b]y September 1865 all of Maryland had
been placed under the jurisdiction of the federal bureau.” 24 As soon as its agents were deployed
to Maryland, the Freedmen’s Bureau “took as one of its first and most important tasks mounting
a legal challenge to the system of apprenticeship.” 25 According to Fields, black families relied
heavily on federal agents and federal authority. Specifically, the Freedmen’s Bureau quickly
descended upon the Eastern Shore of Maryland because of its large number of apprenticed
children to former slave owners and as a result “made apprenticeship one of its chief
concerns.” 26 On the Eastern Shore “Bureau agents identified offending planters, demanded that
they release apprenticed children, and if that failed brought the former to trial before the
Baltimore Criminal Court.” 27

This piece of evidence suggests that it may have been the

Freedmen’s Bureau who initially thought to bring the claims of LC before the Baltimore
Criminal Court and the radical lawyers in Baltimore.
23

Id. at 79.
FIELDS, supra note 7, at 148.
25
Id. at 149.
26
FUKE, supra note 6, at 79.
27
Id. at 80.
24
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The lawyers and politicians engaged in ending apprenticeship in Maryland certainly
encountered significant obstacles. 28 Because the 1860 “Black Codes” were still on the books, a
difficult argument was presented for abolitionist lawyers in that white children, like black
children, could be apprenticed.

Despite the disparate treatment amongst white and black

apprentices, the radical lawyers were nonetheless forced to craft an alternative argument to
counter the state statute’s open discrimination. Among the most prominent abolitionist/radical
lawyers were Henry Stockbridge, 29 Archibald Stirling, Jr., 30 William Daniel, 31 and Henry Winter
Davis. 32 In addition, these lawyers found a sympathetic ear in Baltimore Criminal Court Judge
Hugh Lennox Bond. The legal strategy adopted by these men likely started as early as April
1865, when it appears that Stockbridge, Stirling, Davis, and Bond had dinner with Chief Justice
Salmon P. Chase. 33 The Chief Justice describes the men as “the radicals” 34 and it can only be
assumed that during the course of this dinner that Maryland apprenticeship was a central topic of
discussion. Ultimately, Judge Bond accepted the argument “that the Maryland apprenticeship
law was contrary to the spirit of the state emancipation proclamation,” embodied in the Maryland
Constitution of 1864.35
Over time, the abolitionist/radical lawyers began to craft a legal strategy that targeted
apprenticeship as a whole rather than particularized cases. Fuke details the tactics used by the
lawyers and members of the Bureau, who were “delighted and eager” to attack Maryland’s
28

Id. at 79-80.
See supra Part VI.F.
30
See supra Part VI.G.
31
See supra Part VI.H.
32
Although not a central figure in this case, it should be noted that Henry Winter Davis was often considered in the
same abolitionist group as the other mentioned lawyers. These men represented the central force of lawyers
dedicated to the abolition of the apprenticeship practices in Maryland. For more information on Davis, see JOHN
THOMAS SCHARF, HISTORY OF BALTIMORE CITY AND COUNTY FROM THE EARLIEST DAY: INCLUDING BIOGRAPHICAL
SKETCHES OF THEIR REPRESENTATIVE MEN, 719 (1881). See also FUKE, supra note 6, at 86, n. 73.
33
THE SALMON P. CHASE PAPERS, 527 (Apr. 11, 1865) (John Niven ed., 1993).
34
Id. For clarity, it is important to note that the term “radical” was often used to describe those who harbored
abolitionist and equality views.
35
Richard Paul Fuke, Hugh Lennox Bond and Radical Republican Ideology, 45 J. SOUTHERN HIST. 569, 574 (1979).
29
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apprenticeship laws. 36 Following the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1866, where equal
treatment of both races was demanded, LC’s lawyers were presented with the congressional
mandate they required to bring a case before the federal courts. In October 1867, the efforts of
the radical Republicans to craft a winning legal strategy based upon the substantive issues of
apprenticeship paid off. 37

III.

THE CASE
A. LEAD UP TO THE CASE
The plight of LC and her children is illustrative of many similarly situated black

Maryland families following the adoption of the 1864 constitution. Unable to accept that black
children could be removed from their parents through the binding proceedings, federal agents,
radical lawyers, and black families became actively engaged in filtering out the apprenticeship
system in Maryland. According to Fuke, the “radical lawyers Henry Winter Davis, Henry
Stockbridge, and Archibald Stirling, Jr., brought the cases of several black children before the
Baltimore Criminal Court” in May 1865, to help secure the release of apprenticed children. 38
Although Judge Bond only managed to release a “few children” 39 at this time, it appears from
the timeline that Washington and Simon Coston were among those released and those initially
targeted by the abolitionist lawyers. As previously noted, Stockbridge, Stirling, and Judge Bond
dined with Chief Justice Chase in April 1865, just one month before the described events, and

36

FUKE, supra note 6, at 80.
See infra Part IV.
38
Id. at 78-79.
39
Id. at 79.
37
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likely began devising the litigation strategy needed to overcome Maryland’s apprenticeship
laws. 40

41

On May 6, 1865, with assistance from Stockbridge, Stirling, and Daniel, Judge Hugh
Lennox Bond ordered that the writ of habeas corpus be directed upon Samuel S. Costen to
produce Washington and Simon in front of the Baltimore City Criminal Court. 42 In the Coston v.
Coston opinion, Chief Judge Bowie notes that SSC returned with the children on May 17 and
produced them in front of the court. 43 However, SSC refused to release the children and instead
claimed that the children were legally apprenticed to him under the 1860 Maryland Code of

40

See supra note 33.
Baltimore City Courthouse, circa 1860. Photo available at
http://www.msa.md.gov/megafile/msa/speccol/sc2200/sc2221/000024/000000/html/bccourt.html (lat visited Nov. 28,
2011).
42
Coston v. Coston, 25 Md. 500, 500 (Md. 1866).
43
Id. at 501.
41
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Public General Laws. When SSC returned with the children on May 17th, he brought “copies of
the indentures by which he held [Washington and Simon].”44
On July 16th, 1865, the New York Times ran an article detailing the In re Coston case. 45
The NY Times noted that SSC was denied his petition for the return of Simon and Washington
by Judge Bond and that the decision was subsequently affirmed by the Court of Appeals of
Maryland.

The Times summed up the Court’s holding as recognizing “that the present

constitution of the State does not permit former slaveowners to retain under the guise of
apprenticeship the odious features of the discarded system of slavery.” 46 The NY Times article
thus demonstrates the degree to which other states found the Maryland “Black Codes” to
exemplify the remaining vestiges of slavery in Maryland.
Although the timeline is sketchy, according to The Baltimore Sun, the parties were
involved in a separate proceeding in Anne Arundel County. 47 The Sun notes that Judge Tuck of
Anne Arundel County ruled in favor of Costen, and The Sun noted the “conflicting decisions
thereupon.” 48 That the case reached the Court of Appeals of Maryland is thus unsurprising,
given the conflicting judgments by Judge Bond of Baltimore and Judge Tuck of Anne Arundel
County. According to Fuke, the “Maryland constitution permitted any court in the state to hear
applications for writs of habeas corpus, no matter what the county of . . . origin.” 49 This allowed
Judge Bond (and like-minded Judges) to “consider pleas of parents who claimed they were
capable of maintaining their children and that the children’s apprenticeships were illegal.”50
Because judges were able to consider habeas corpus proceedings without regard to jurisdiction,
44

Id.
General News, NY TIMES, July 17, 1865, available at http://www.nytimes.com/1865/07/16/news/generalnews.html?pagewanted=1.
46
Id.
47
Local Matters, BALTIMORE SUN, July 10, 1865.
48
Id.
49
Fuke, supra note 35, at 574.
50
Id.
45
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Stockbridge, Stirling, and Daniel were able to challenge Simon and Washington’s apprenticeship
in the more favorable Baltimore forum. The conflicting decisions most likely represent the split
in ideologies between the big city of Baltimore and the more rural Anne Arundel County.
Subsequently, SSC demurred as to Judge Bond’s order discharging the children. 51
However, Judge Bond overruled the demurrer and held that no appeal may lie in a Habeas
corpus proceeding, 52 thus denying SSC’s attempt to file a writ of error with the Court of
Appeals. However, the Court of Appeals of Maryland took issue with Judge Bond’s declaration
as to its jurisdiction, and as a result, granted jurisdiction to resolve the conflicting decisions.
B. In re Coston 53
The case of In re Coston was really just a procedural case that led up to the more
substantive (albeit procedural in itself) case of Coston v. Coston. This preliminary opinion
issued by the Court of Appeals of Maryland declined to discuss any of the substantive issues of
the case. Instead, In re Coston affirmatively declared that the Court of Appeals of Maryland, not
the criminal circuit courts of Baltimore, were to be the final decisionmakers as to whether
jurisdiction is appropriate. 54 Chief Judge Richard Johns Bowie 55 noted that “[i]t is the exclusive
right and province of this Court to determine the bounds of its jurisdiction, and decide in what
cases an appeal does or does not lie from the judgments of inferior tribunals.” 56 Noting that a
more thorough opinion would be forthcoming, Bowie was reluctant to delve into the substantive
issues of the case. 57

The Court thereafter briefly discussed the nature of habeas corpus

proceedings on the jurisdictional rights of the courts and found that “the writ of habeas corpus, is
51

Coston v. Coston, 25 Md. 500, 501 (Md. 1866).
In re Coston, 23 Md. 271, 271 (Md. 1865).
53
23 Md. 271 (Md. 1865).
54
In re Coston, 23 Md. 271, 272 (Md. 1865).
55
See infra Part VI.C.
56
In re Coston, 23 Md. 271, 272 (Md. 1865).
57
Id. at 271-72.
52
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a proceeding summary in its character, addressed to the discretion of the Judge or tribunal, to
whom the application is made.” 58 Simon and Washington likely remained free with their mother
during the appeal process, as they awaited the forthcoming opinion promised by Chief Judge
Bowie in In re Coston.
C. Coston v. Coston 59
The case of Coston v. Coston represents one of the earliest efforts by LC’s radical
lawyers to secure the release of apprentices bound to their former masters. In fact, the case
illustrates a clash of Maryland ideologies amongst the political and legal influences of the time.
On the one hand, anti-slavery Unionists, such as Stockbridge, Stirling, Daniel, and Bond sought
to eliminate the apprenticeship system, at least to the extent that black apprentices were treated
unequally with white apprentices. On the other hand, Unionists with Southern heritage and
sympathies sought to maintain their last grasp on forced labor.

These competing factions

ultimately found their way before Maryland’s high court in the April term of 1866. 60
1. Arguments and Procedural History
The preliminary portion of the opinion is devoted to providing the relevant facts and
details underlying the decision. In addition to providing a brief timeline for the events, the Court
explained that LC argued that the children were “illegally arrested” and “held in custody” by
SSC. In response, SSC claimed that the children were legally apprenticed to him. 61
Next, the opinion details the arguments produced by the parties. The first argument
stated that “the parents of [Simon and Washington] were not summoned to be present at the

58

Id. at 272.
Coston v. Coston, 25 Md. 500, 501 (Md. 1866).
60
In re Coston, 23 Md. 271, 272 (Md. 1865). The precedent In re Coston case mentions that the forthcoming
decision in Coston v. Coston would be decided in the April term of 1866.
61
Coston v. Coston, 25 Md. 500, 500 (Md. 1866).
59
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binding” of Simon and Washington to SSC.62 This first allegation on the part of LC is quite
consistent with the situation depicted above, 63 where parents were often not notified as to
binding proceedings involving their children. If LC’s allegations are taken to be true, this would
suggest that SSC likely bound the children rather quickly in order to prevent LC from attending
the orphans’ court proceeding. The Coston children were thus likely amongst the 765 children
alleged to have been apprenticed in Somerset County immediately following ratification of the
1864 constitution 64
The third portion of LC’s argument claims that at the time of the binding, “the parents
were able to support [Simon and Washington] and keep them employed so as to teach them
habits of industry, and were still so willing and able.” 65 This claim once again illustrates the
common characteristics running through apprenticeship cases in the summer of 1865. Even if
LC had been present at the binding proceeding, it is disputable whether she would have
possessed the necessary “means” to meet the orphans’ court binding burden. That the parents
were not present and that they were “willing and able” to care for the children only further
suggests that SSC intentionally deprived LC of the opportunity to present her case to the
Orphans’ court.
Another notable part of the argument is that LC wished to teach Simon and Washington
the “habits of industry.” The “habits of industry” argument is once again illustrative of the
commonalities between Coston and other apprenticeship cases. Fuke explains that “[i]n the
control of, provision for, and deployment of their children, freed parents sought to wrest this

62

Id. at 501.
See supra Part II.
64
FUKE, supra note 6, at 70. This figure is cited by Fuke to a letter sent from a W.H. Gales to E.C. Knower on
February 22, 1867.
65
Coston v. Coston, 25 Md. 500, 501 (Md. 1866).
63
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important aspect of rural economic control from the hands of whites.” 66 The foundation of an
autonomous and free family in the mid-nineteenth century necessitated families being able to
“use their families as the organizing agencies of total family labor.” 67 Indeed, only “[w]ith
possession of their children” would black parents be “assured . . . the autonomy that they so
ardently sought.” 68
It is interesting to note that LC’s arguments contain only cursory reference to genuine
constitutional arguments. The one constitutional point raised by LC was that “the detention of
[her] children under the color of apprenticeship . . . was a detention in slavery or involuntary
servitude contrary to [the] Constitution [of 1864].”69 As previously discussed, this argument was
an integral part of the early legal strategies used by Stockbridge, Stirling, and Daniel to bring
about an end to post-emancipation apprenticeship. The argument was that these bindings were
“contrary to the spirit of the state emancipation proclamation” 70 and instead were a vestige of
involuntary servitude. By the time of In re Turner, however, these lawyers had the full power of
the federal government and the constitution at their disposal.
Unlike the substantive and constitutional arguments advanced by Leah Coston, SSC’s
arguments largely centered on procedure. SSC sought to overturn Judge Bond’s decision to
release the children through a writ of error. 71 It was conceded by both parties that a writ of error
would only life after a “final judgment,” 72 but the unique nature of habeas corpus decisions

66

FUKE, supra note 6, at 69.
Id.
68
FUKE, supra note 6, at 82.
69
Coston v. Coston, 25 Md. 500, 501 (Md. 1866).
70
See supra note 35.
71
The writ of error, or error coram nobis, was a procedural tactic used in both civil and criminal to address an
alleged wrong committed by the trial court. Edward N. Robinson, The Writ of Error Coram Nobis and Coram
Vobis, 2 DUKE BAR J. 29, 30 (1951). According to Robinson, the writ of error was not used to “authorize a court to
review its opinion, but only to vacate some adjudication made.” Id. The writ of error, however, could only lie after
a final judgment.
72
Coston v. Coston, 25 Md. 500, 506 (Md. 1866).
67
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complicated the question of whether a final judgment had been entered. Accordingly, a large
part of the Coston litigation centered around resolving the dispute over the nature of Judge
Bond’s decision.
During arguments, LC’s attorneys countered the procedural claims made by SSC.
Stockbridge, Stirling, and Daniel argued that a “writ of error will not lie at common law upon a
habeas corpus” because such a proceeding is not a “final judgment.” 73 Moreover, LC argued
that an appeal, in addition to the writ of error, “will not lie upon habeas corpus” because habeas
corpus “is not final or conclusive.” 74 Accordingly, LC argued that the writ of error should be
dismissed on procedural grounds, despite her strong objections on the substantive issues of the
case.
2. The Opinion
Chief Judge Richard Johns Bowie delivered the opinion of the Court on July 17, 1866.
First, Chief Judge Bowie explained the nature of habeas corpus proceedings and how and where
a writ of error may lie. Citing the earlier case of In re Costen, the Chief Judge explained that a
habeas corpus decision was not subject to appeal or the writ of error because a habeas corpus
matter is not a final judgment. 75
The Chief Judge continued by tracing the historical underpinnings of the common law
understanding of the writ of error and its relationship to habeas corpus. Part of this portion of
the opinion discusses the manner in which the courts at English common law dealt with the
relationship between the writ of error and habeas corpus. Chief Judge Bowie references a
decision issued by New York Chief Justice James Kent in which Kent traces this history in
England. That a habeas corpus decision was not a final judgment and thus not entitled to a writ
73

Id. at 503.
Id. at 504.
75
Id. at 504-05.
74
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of error was considered “established law . . . [a] principle . . . of immemorial standing” and an
“uncontroverted maxim of ages.” 76 Kent thus demonstrated that the arguments presented by the
parties had been resolved by the English courts at common law.
Subsequently, the opinion traced the history of habeas corpus’ impact upon the writ of
error in the United States. Chief Judge Bowie notes at least one case involving the Supreme
Court of the United States, in which the high court remanded a decision issued by the Supreme
Court of Vermont. The Supreme Court in Holmes v. Jennison 77 held that a writ of error will lie
in federal court because the case involved a foreign fugitive, thus arising under the
Constitution. 78

As Chief Judge Bowie later notes, however, the Holmes decision was not

controlling on the Court of Appeals of Maryland. 79 It is interesting to see Federalism at work in
the mid-nineteenth century, when state courts were weary of any federal intrusion into state
jurisdiction and declined to follow Supreme Court precedent.

The Federalism relationship

would, however, ultimately be a decisive component of the apprenticeship laws, as it took
federal intervention by Chief Justice Salmon P. Chase to finally end the practice of disparate
apprenticeship laws in Maryland. 80
Ultimately, Chief Judge Bowie and the rest of the Court of Appeals of Maryland did not
touch on the substantive issues and merits of the case. Because the Court found in favor of LC
on the procedural and jurisdictional argument, 81 the Court declined to wade into the controversial
waters of the apprenticeship question. Chief Judge Bowie explained that because LC prevailed

76

Id. at 506.
39 U.S. 540, 579 (1840).
78
Id.
79
Coston v. Coston, 25 Md. 500, 508 (Md. 1866) (noting that “the authority of [Federal] cases cannot control the
series of decisions to the contrary in State Courts.”).
80
See infra Part IV.
81
Coston, 25 Md. at 508-09 (quoting a man named Hurd, Bowie writes that “[t]he current authority in the State
Courts is, that a review of a decision on habeas corpus, independently of statutory provisions, cannot be had by writ
of error or appeal, and that, on that ground that the decision is not a final judgment.”).
77
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on procedural grounds, it was “unnecessary, as well as improper, to consider the other points
raised by the briefs of the respective parties.” 82 Thus, the Court was able to reach something of a
compromise decision, as the Court secured the release of LC’s children, but nonetheless did not
disturb other apprenticeship bindings elsewhere in the State.
IV.

SUBSEQUENT HISTORY – IN RE TURNER

The underlying issues raised in In re Coston and Coston v. Coston were finally
substantively addressed in the case of In re Elizabeth Turner. 83 The facts of In re Turner are
strikingly similar to the facts alleged in Coston. In re Turner concerned the detention of a former
child slave, Elizabeth Turner, by her former master, a Philemon T. Hambleton, in Talbot County,
Maryland. 84 Turner, like Washington and Simon, had been bound to her former master at a
Talbot County orphans’ court proceeding in which Turner’s mother “was not summoned to
appear before the orphans’ court . . . on the day of making the alleged indentures of
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apprenticeship.” 85 Indeed, Turner was apprenticed just “two days after she became free,” a
regular occurrence as described by Fuke, supra.
Moreover, the facts are similar to Coston in that Elizabeth Turner’s mother claimed that
she was “able, ready, and willing to support [Turner].” 86 As previously noted, this situation
exemplified the common practices of apprenticeship in Maryland following the ratification of the
1864 constitution. Parents of the apprenticed children were often not summoned to appear at the
binding proceeding, and when they did, the ability to provide the “means” to support the children
was often restricted solely to monetary means. The sequence of events depicted in Turner alone
demonstrate the illustrative nature of Coston within this period of Maryland history.
However, there is at least one important distinction between the facts alleged in Coston
and the facts alleged in Turner. In Coston, SSC claimed that Washington and Simon were
legally indentured to him as his apprentices and there was no mention of LC’s involvement in the
binding. In Turner, however, Hambleton argued that Turner’s mother had willfully consented to
the binding and the apprenticeship was thus a legally enforceable contract. Margaret Burnham
explains that “fundamental contract principles were perverted to serve neoslavery” 87 during this
time. Moreover, “Turner's plight illustrates how, in the aftermath of the war, contract law was
quickly harnessed to the planters' efforts to re-enslave blacks.” 88 Ultimately, however, the case
was decided on loftier constitutional grounds rather than common law contract rationale.
In re Turner was decided while Chief Justice Salmon P. Chase of the Supreme Court of
the United States was riding circuit in Baltimore. In the nineteenth century, it was commonplace
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for Federal judges to “ride circuit” on lower courts and sit as a visiting judge. 89 Professor G.
Edward White notes that “Chase's earliest construction of the Reconstruction amendments gave
every indication that he was entirely willing to recognize the Thirteenth Amendment as having
decisive sovereignty implications.” 90 In re Turner thus presented Chase the opportunity to
consider and frame the relationship between the newly enacted Thirteenth and Fourteenth
Amendments, as well as the corresponding Congressional Civil Rights Act of 1866, with the
state and local laws that appeared to contravene the intentions of those laws.
According to Fuke, the “persistence” of Stockbridge, Stirling, and Daniel “paid off”
when Chief Justice Chase agreed to hear the case of Elizabeth Turner. 91 By this point, these
abolitionist lawyers were “[a]rmed with briefs attacking every aspect of the system,” 92 thus
demonstrating the full evolution of their legal strategy. The early strategies used required
attacking the contravention of the “spirit” of the constitution, but these lawyers were later able to
utilize the full panoply of new weapons with which to attack apprenticeship.
Chief Justice Chase heard arguments in the United States District Court for the District of
Maryland in Baltimore on October 15, 1867. The following day, October 16, 1867, Chase
delivered his opinion releasing Turner from the custody of her former master. However, the
Chief Justice regretted being “obliged to consider [Turner] without the benefit of any argument”
by Hambleton. 93 Hambleton seemed disinclined to invest much into the case and said that
although he wished to retain his apprenticeship over Turner, Hambleton nonetheless “did not feel
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sufficient interest in the case to spend any money on it.” 94 Indeed, according to court records,
“[t]he chief justice said that the questions in the case were so grave and important that he should
prefer to be advised by the argument of counsel on the part of [Hambleton].” 95

Chase’s

characterization of Turner as “grave and important” thus contextualizes the issues confronting
Chase. At the heart of this case was a maelstrom of competing issues like constitutional law,
federalism, natural law, and notions of liberty, all against the backdrop of Reconstruction
America in one of the most politically and ideologically divided States at the time.
However, unlike Judge Bond and the Court of Appeals of Maryland, Chase had valuable
weapons to strike down the apprenticeship laws. Although the Thirteenth Amendment had been
ratified by the time of the Coston case, it nonetheless went unconsidered by Chief Judge Bowie
and the Court of Appeals majority. Chief Justice Chase, on the other hand, was able to use both
the Thirteenth Amendment and the newly passed Civil Rights Act of 1866, which prohibited
disparate treatment amongst blacks and whites, to craft his opinion.
During arguments, Henry Stockbridge represented Turner and Turner’s mother.
According to The Baltimore Sun, Stockbridge claimed that “the sort of apprenticeship adopted in
Maryland was an evasion of the constitutional amendment abolishing slavery and involuntary
servitude.” 96 Thus, Stockbridge, Stirling, and Daniel were finally able to present the substantive
arguments they long desired to abolish the disparate apprenticeship laws in Maryland. These
heavy constitutional and natural law arguments were clearly the product of over two years of
crafting their legal strategy. Stockbridge stressed the impact that the Turner decision would have
on “the condition of thousands of colored minors” to illustrate the widespread apprenticeship

94

Id. at 338-39.
Id. at 339.
96
Local Matters, BALTIMORE SUN, Oct. 16, 1867.
95

23

practices in Maryland. 97 The urgency of freeing thousands of black minors illegally bound
seems to have weighed heavily on the Chief Justice, as Chase noted that “the time does not allow
for more” 98 consideration of the issues.
The opinion itself began by detailing the relevant facts of the case, which I previously
discussed above. The Chief Justice next confronted the disparate treatment between black and
white apprentices under the Maryland apprenticeship laws. 99 Chase found that “the variance is
manifest,” most notably because white apprentices were required to “be taught reading, writing,
and arithmetic.” 100 Moreover, Chase argued that black apprentices are “described in the law as a
‘property and interest’” and that “no such description is applied to authority over a white
apprentice.” 101 Along the property interest line, Burnham explains that Chief Justice Chase
declined to consider whether Turner’s binding was a valid contract “but instead, with prophetic
appreciation of the minefields that lay ahead, sought to provide muscle to the Thirteenth
Amendment.” 102
Ultimately, Chief Justice Chase’s decision represented a “victorious end [to] a campaign
waged by Stockbridge and others” to root out unequal apprenticeship practices in Maryland. 103
The craftily planned litigation strategy devised by the radical lawyers bore substantial fruit with
the Turner decision. Indeed, with a favorable federal outcome in hand, the end to unequal in
apprenticeship in Maryland would inevitably come to an end.
V.

CONCLUSION
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The plight of Leah Coston and her children, embodied in the case of Coston v. Coston, is
clearly representative of the plight of many black families following ratification of the Maryland
Constitution of 1864. However, thanks to the efforts of federal agents, politicians, and radical
lawyers, there was a swell of support for these families to aid in the eradication of the
apprenticeship system as it existed in Maryland. By devising a carefully planned litigation
strategy, these radical lawyers were able to secure the release of thousands of black minors
illegally apprenticed to their former masters. After more than two years of attacking Maryland
apprenticeship, these efforts paid huge dividends when Chief Justice Salmon P. Chase decided
the case of In re Turner. Ultimately, Coston v. Coston represents just one story out of thousands
afflicted by Maryland apprenticeship following the Civil War.

VI.

BIOGRAPHIE
S
In the following section, I identify the most relevant figures involved in the Coston case

and attempt to detail their relevant biographies. The purpose of this section is thus to highlight
the most influential players in this case and in so doing, theorize as to their positions,
motivations, and rationale with respect to their roles in Coston. Accordingly, although the
following sections contain significant biographical information, the sections are nonetheless
intended to demonstrate how these figures’ respective backgrounds, relationships, and ideologies
influenced their participation in Coston.

A.

SAMUEL SMITH
COSTEN AND THE COSTEN FAMILY
Samuel Smith Costen, the appellant in the case of Coston v. Coston, was evidently from a

prominent family in Somerset County, Maryland.
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Born in Somerset County, Maryland in

1809, 104 Costen grew up with a substantial amount of land, known as the “Norfolk Plantation” in
Dublin, MD near modern-day Pocomoke City, Maryland. 105

106
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The location of Dublin, Maryland is supported by the reporting of a homicide on Samuel S.
Costen’s land on December 16, 1859. 107 Of particular interest is that the newspaper article adds
“esq.” to the end of Costen’s name, indicating that Costen was likely a lawyer. 108 However, this
is the sole piece of evidence I have been able to uncover that suggests that SSC was indeed a
lawyer. However, if Costen were indeed a lawyer, it would explain his access to the revered
lawyers of William Schley, 109 Ezekiel F. Chambers, 110 and William S. Waters. 111 As noted by
Arthur Downey, lawyers during this time were among the most well-connected and most notable
figures in mid-nineteenth century Maryland. 112 The already well-connected network described
below would be all the more interesting if SSC were indeed a lawyer himself. Ultimately,
however, the report of the homicide committed by a “negro man” was clearly news enough to
find its way all the way to Baltimore. 113
As can be seen in the map above, the Costen’s owned several miles worth of land,
belonging to multiple Costen family members. Costen’s Station appears to have been located
directly on the Newtown Branch Railroad. This is particularly interesting, as a Baltimore Sun
Article in 1859 reported news out of Somerset County that Samuel S. Costen had been elected as
one of the directors of the new Eastern Shore Railroad. 114 Later, another Baltimore Sun article
noted that an “S.S. Costen” was re-elected as a director of the Eastern Shore Railroad in
Somerset County in July, 1866 (coincidentally, the same time that the Court of Appeals handed
106
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down its decision in Coston.) 115 In another interesting twist, it appears that the newly elected
directors of the Eastern Shore Railroad Co. in 1859 thereafter elected John W. Crisfield as the
president. 116 Costen later testified before the Maryland House and claimed to have voted for
Crisfield for United States Representative in 1861. 117
Crisfield and SSC’s positions were likely representative of many Marylanders during the
Civil War, who were caught in the crossroads of being a southern slave-holding Union state.
Like Crisfield, SSC admitted to being a Unionist in the Maryland House of Delegates
testimony. 118 Crisfield was a staunch supporter of the Union, but nonetheless felt that abolition
was too extreme. Instead, Crisfield argued that “slavery was actually better for the slaves than
the conditions they would face on their own.” 119 Crisfield’s prominence indirectly illustrates
SSC’s power and influence in the region, especially given that President Lincoln met privately
with Crisfield in 1862 to discuss possible compensation for slave owners for freed slaves. 120 The
connection between Costen, Crisfield, and Schley particularly illustrates a common ideology at
the time of this case, that of having Union sympathies, but nonetheless exhibiting strong
slaveholding preferences.
Other details of SSC’s life similarly contextualize his background and beliefs. Marriage
records of Somerset County indicate that Samuel S. Costen married Mary H. Miles in 1829.121
As mentioned above, SSC was questioned over disputed elections in January 1866. 122 Without
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the interrogatories in, it is difficult to determine exactly what Samuel Costen was answering.
However, the first interrogatory appears to have been a question as to Costen’s age and years
voting. 123 Thereafter, Costen discusses briefly that he considered himself a “Union man,” but
interestingly enough, SSC seems to be answering question to rebut his alleged “disloyalty.”124
The veracity of SSC’s statements that day may never be known, but it is likely that the truth lie
somewhere in the middle.
The picture presented about SSC is that he was likely a man of considerable influence the
Eastern Shore. Despite considering himself a Unionist, SSC was nonetheless unwilling to part
with his apprentice, which likely represents many Eastern Shore slaveowners at the time.
Indeed, the reconstruction of SSC’s history fits perfectly within the context I described above.

B.

JUDGE
LENNOX BOND - BALTIMORE CITY CRIMINAL COURT
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HUGH

Judge Hugh Lennox Bond was born in Baltimore, Maryland on December 16, 1828125
and died in his hometown of Baltimore on October 24, 1893. Although born in Baltimore, Judge
Bond spent much of his youth and educational years in New York City. 126 Bond matriculated to
the University of the City of New York before returning to Baltimore and was admitted to the
Maryland bar in 1851. 127 Bond’s northern education very well may have had an impact on his
political and ideological leanings during his formative years.
Bond’s decision releasing Simon and Washington from SSC seems quite consistent with
his views, politics, ideology, and societal prejudices that were common during the time period.
According to Fuke, “Bond declared his opposition to slavery early,” and aligned himself to
Know-Nothing and Union party politics. 128 Bond was a “staunch supporter of Lincoln and the
Union cause” and as a result “became intensely unpopular” during the Civil War. 129 Bond’s
leanings were manifest in his legal accomplishments as he “defended those in impoverished
circumstances without thought or desire for pecuniary gain” with the same degree of fortitude as
those “which brought him his largest fees.” 130 During the tumultuous years following the
Maryland constitution of 1864, Bond served as “spokesman for the Unionists’ Radical faction
and helped shape its growing commitment to further elevation of blacks.” 131 Indeed, Bond’s
views on blacks were “well known” and many knew Bond was “clearly a proponent of black
elevation.” 132
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Bond was elected to the Criminal Court of Baltimore in 1861 and served in that position
throughout the Civil War. During that time, Bond heard a myriad of different kinds of cases.
However, and notably for this paper, Judge Bond presided over many cases much like the one in
Coston.
Despite Bond’s clear goal of advancing black rights in Reconstruction Maryland, Bond,
like many other Marylanders, harbored societal prejudices against blacks that were born out of
years of societal norms. Indeed, Bond believed that “blacks could be elevated without changing
their relative status; that society could retain its racial distinctions.” 133 For instance, Bond “often
spoke in terms of paternalistic and moral obligation” when discussing the rights of freedmen and
their children. 134
In this vein, Bond also seems to have devoted a significant amount of time to
philanthropy. Specifically, Judge Bond actively supported a local organization known as the
Baltimore Association for the Moral and Educational Improvement of the Colored People. 135
The goal of the organization was to help secure greater educational opportunities for freed black
children and Bond served as a member of the Board of managers throughout the duration of his
commitment to the program. 136 His philanthropic endeavors pertaining to black education stems
from his belief that it was the responsibility of white Marylanders to assist in the education of
blacks. 137 Thus, Bond’s private and public life equally suggest his strong opposition to the
unequal treatment of black children within Maryland’s apprenticeship laws.
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dedication to ending the plight of newly freed black families clearly left an impression on Chief
Justice Salmon P. Chase, who described Bond as a “thorough able and earnest man.” 138
Subsequently, Bond worked his way up from the Baltimore City Court all the way to the
United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit. Judge Bond was nominated by President
Ulysses S. Grant to the Fourth Circuit in 1870 and confirmed by the Senate late that year. 139
Judge Bond’s legacy is certainly shaped by his decisions to release black apprentices.
Indeed, Judge Bond secured the release of (likely) hundreds of black apprentices between 1865
and 1867. Having a sympathetic Judge like Judge Bond at the circuit court likely allowed
Stockbridge, Stirling, and Daniel to devote significant time in preparation for the appellate
process, as they knew favorable judgments were likely under Judge Bond. Ultimately, however,
Bond’s contributions in this period exemplify that of radical republican ideology.
C.

CHIEF
RICHARD JOHNS BOWIE – COURT OF APPEALS OF MARYLAND
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JUDGE

Richard Johns Bowie was born in 1807 in Georgetown, D.C., to a “wealthy Georgetown
family.” 141 In his early years, Bowie attended public schools followed by Brookeville Academy
in Montgomery County, MD. 142 Subsequently, Bowie matriculated to Georgetown University
Law School where he graduated in 1826 at age nineteen. 143 After practicing law for several
years (where he was admitted to the bar in Washington, D.C. and admitted to the United States
Supreme Court bar), Bowie was elected as a member of the Maryland House of Delegates form
1935-1937 and . 144 After his years of service in the Maryland State legislature, Bowie returned
home to Montgomery County, where he served as the County prosecutor from 1844-1849.
Bowie’s distinguished public service life continued in 1849, when he was elected to the
United States House of Representatives. Bowie was twice elected to the United States House of
Representatives as a Whig representing Maryland’s (then) First Congressional District. 145 As a
Congressman, Bowie was remembered as an “eloquent, forcible, and convincing speaker and
always actively interested in any important measure brought before Congress.” 146

Bowie

considered himself a disciple and “ardent admirer of Henry Clay” and his first public speech as a
Congressman was allegedly made in support of the Missouri Compromise of 1850. 147 Bowie’s
support of Clay and his politics as a Whig demonstrate a more moderate and tempered approach
140
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to the contentious issues of the day. Clay, known as the “Great Compromiser,” was a moderate
and Bowie’s decision in Coston certainly represents a more moderate approach because it
reached the Republican/Unionist judgment by requiring the discharge of the Coston children
without addressing the overarching substantive merits.
Thereafter, Bowie was nominated as the Whig candidate for Maryland Governor in
1854. 148 Effie Gwynee Bowie explains that because “[t]he slavery question was one of the
burning questions of the day,” the Whig party became fractured and was unable to consolidate
around a single Whig candidate. 149 As a result, Thomas Watkins Ligon defeated Bowie and the
Whig party witnessed its sharp decline.
According to Effie Gwynne Bowie, Richard Johns Bowie was “[b]itterly opposed to
[s]ecession and a firm supporter of the Union.” 150 Unable to coalesce sufficient support behind
the banner of the Whig Party, it is reported that Bowie later affiliated with the “Union
Democrats.” 151 Along those lines, the Dictionary of American Biography notes that Bowie was
a “staunch Unionist, and with the unanswering honesty and moral courage that marked the man,
he opposed secession and tried to avert the war he felt was inevitable.” 152
McSherry describes Bowie as having been “an affable, distinguished, polished
gentleman” and as Chief Judge “presided with grace and dignity and his opinions display
learning and research.” 153 Another account noted that Bowie was “[a] man of brilliant intellect,
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combined with much legal learning.” 154 These depictions of Bowie are consistent with the
opinion issued in Coston, as he used his “intellect” and “legal learning” to craft a moderate
opinion that still effectuated the result desired.
Ultimately, Chief Judge Bowie was an icon of nineteenth century Maryland legal and
political community. His life was clearly dedicated to public service and by all accounts was
considered a learned lawyer with a bright intellect and congenial disposition. Given the various
descriptions available today, it is unsurprising that Chief Judge Bowie’s decision came out the
way it did in Coston v. Coston. Being a Unionist and an abolitionist certainly set the stage for a
showdown over questionable apprenticeship practices. Nonetheless, Bowie’s acute legal and
political acumen comes into play during Coston, as Bowie and the other judges of the Court of
Appeals decline to touch on the substantive merits of the case, and instead rule in favor of LC on
procedural grounds.

D.

EZEKIEL
CHAMBERS – ATTORNEY FOR SAMUEL S. COSTEN
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F.

Ezekiel Forman Chambers was born in Kent County, Maryland in 1788. 156 In his early
years, Chambers served in the War of 1812 as a Captain and later a Brigadier General in the
local militia. 157

In 1822, Chambers was elected to the Maryland Senate.

Subsequently,

Chambers served as the United States Senator from Maryland from 1826-1834. 158
Following Chambers’ tenure as Senator, he served on the Court of Appeals of Maryland
from 1834-1851. 159 This fact is interesting given that Chambers was involved in the preliminary
case of In re Coston and had Chambers still been a member of the Court, he very well may have
had an impact on the proceedings. As is typical with the other lawyers and judges in this section,
Chambers’ ideology was likely a product of his background. Chambers seems to be the oldest
amongst the group included in this section and thus likely was influenced by previous
generations. Indeed, by the time of In re Coston, Chambers was already seventy-seven years
old. Chambers likely harbored similar views as those of SSC and this is assumption is also
illustrated by the fact that Chambers ran for Governor as a Democrat in 1864. Once again, the
strong connection of lawyers from the time seems to be manifest in SSC’s ability to retain the
likes of Ezekiel F. Chambers as counsel.
E.

WILLIAM
SCHLEY – ATTORNEY FOR SAMUEL S. COSTEN
William Schley was born to a prominent Fredericksburg family on October, 31, 1799. 160

Schley’s father, Thomas Schley, was considered a “much respected and honored citizen.”161
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Thomas Schley, a legal man himself, served as Chief Judge of the Frederick County Orphans
Court and continued his public service as a representative of Frederick County in the Maryland
legislature. 162 William Schley graduated from Princeton in 1821 and was thereafter admitted to
the Maryland Bar in 1824. 163
In his politics, William Schley was a devoted Whig and even presided over the Whig
ratification meeting in 1856, which occurred in Baltimore. Schley also served in the Maryland
legislature as a Senator from Frederick County. During his time as State Senator, Schley served
as Chairman of the Judiciary Committee and Chairman of the Constitution Committee in
1836. 164 In a rather interesting tale of the times, it appears that during the course of drafting a
new constitution, Mr. Schley’s relationships and motives in the drafting were called into question
by a William Cost Johnson. 165 As a result, Schley challenged Johnson to a duel, which took
place near Alexandria, Virginia on February 13, 1837. 166 During the duel, both Schley and
Johnson were wounded after a single exchange of shots. 167
Following Schley’s time in the State legislature, he more or less retired from politics in
order to focus more intently on his legal practice. 168 Thereafter, Schley dedicated his “life and
energies . . . almost exclusively . . . to the profession of the law.” 169 Throughout his career, he
was considered courteous, mannered, and even sought to help and instruct the younger lawyers
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of the day. 170 Schley’s legal reputation apparently spread beyond the city and state and was
“frequently consulted by clients from abroad or in other States.” 171
Schley was considered an “eminent lawyer of [his] time” 172 and Scharf refers to Schley
as an “intellectual giant” in the same breath as the famous Reverdy Johnson. 173 Others have
referred to Schley as “one of the leaders of the Baltimore bar, and one of the most distinguished
and successful advocates whom the state of Maryland has ever produced.” 174 It is unsurprising
that Schley chose to represent SSC given Schley’s reconciliatory attitude towards the South.
Schley’s reconciliatory approach is manifest in his support for General George McClellan in the
1864 election. Ultimately, Schley certainly had southern or more moderate sympathies such that
he was willing to represent SSC in Coston.
F.

HENRY SMITH
STOCKBRIDGE – ATTORNEY FOR LEAH COSTON
Henry Stockbridge, one of the three lawyers representing Leah Coston in Coston v.

Coston, rose to prominence during the Civil War as an abolitionist and strong advocate of equal
rights.

Born in 1822 in Massachusetts, Stockbridge attended Amherst College, where he

graduated in 1845. 175 Subsequently, Stockbridge moved to Baltimore, where he was admitted to
the Maryland bar in 1848. 176
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Fields describes an interesting encounter involving Stockbridge following Chase’s
decision in Turner. Evidently, a black mother sought to obtain her children from their master
and “armed with a letter from the Baltimore attorney and Union party notable Henry
Stockbridge” demanded that the children be returned to her. 177 In response, the master, Steven
Fuller of Calvert County, sent back a response that “Stockbridge is a liar and never told the
truth.” 178
The torch of Stockbridge’s reputable legal career was carried forward by his son, Henry
Stockbridge, Jr. Stockbridge, Jr. created an exemplary legal reputation of his own, having
received his LL.B. from the University of Maryland School of Law in 1878. Subsequently,
Stockbridge, Jr. was elected to the United States House of Representatives in 1888 and served in
that capacity for one-term from 1889-1891. Thereafter, Stockbridge, Jr. served as a judge on the
Supreme Bench of Baltimore City before being nominated to be an Associate Judge on the Court
of Appeals of Maryland, where he served until his death. Stockbridge, Jr. was also a guest
lecturer at the University of Maryland School of Law and served on the University of Maryland
Board of Regents from 1907-1920. 179
In general, there seems to be little biographical information on Henry Stockbridge, Sr.
The one thing that is apparent throughout much of my research, however, is the high esteem with
which he was regarded by his contemporaries. Contextually, Stockbridge was clearly at the
forefront of the apprenticeship battle and, in my opinion, was the lead attorney throughout much
of the litigation in both Coston and Turner.
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apprenticeship cases is notable, it is clear that Stockbridge made a lasting and substantial impact
on at least two Maryland families.

G.

ARCHIBALD
STIRLING, JR. – ATTORNEY FOR LEAH COSTON

Archibald Stirling, Jr. was considered one of the most prominent attorneys of his time.180
Educated at Baltimore private schools, Stirling subsequently matriculated to Princeton
University, where he graduated in 1851. 181 Admitted to the Maryland Bar in 1854, Stirling
“[rose] to the first rank of lawyers at the Bar [of Baltimore].” 182
Stirling’s politics were very much aligned with those of Judge Bond and Stockbridge. A
staunch Unionist, Stirling was originally a member of the American Party and Union Party
before becoming “a recognized leader of the Republican party.” 183 In this political capacity,
Stirling was elected to the Maryland House of Delegates in 1858, where he served as chairman
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of the House Committee on Ways and Means. 184 Scharf describes Stirling as “[f]irm and
decided in his political opinions” and “always exhibited the courage of his convictions and
maintained his principles without regard to their popularity in the community.” 185
These depictions are quite consistent with that of Stockbridge, as both were champions of
black rights in Maryland. Indeed, Stockbridge and Stirling are frequently mentioned together
and seem to have formed something of a partnership aimed at obtaining this equality.
H.

WILLIAM
DANIEL – ATTORNEY FOR LEAH COSTON

186

William Daniel, the third of Leah Coston’s “great triumvirate” of abolitionist lawyers,
was born in 1821 in Deal Island, Somerset County, Maryland. 187 Subsequently, Daniel attended
Dickinson College in Pennsylvania, where he graduated in 1848. 188 Daniel returned to Maryland
following graduation and was admitted to the Maryland bar in 1851. 189 After beginning his law
practice, Daniel was elected to the Maryland State Legislature as a member of the American
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Party in 1853, where he advocated a strong platform of temperance and abolitionism. 190 After
moving up to the Maryland State Senate, Daniel became an “avid anti-slavery Republican.” 191
Following Daniel’s life in public service, Daniel began to take up apprenticeship cases
throughout Maryland. Daniel, who was a “radical lawyer” started using the recently passed
federal Civil Rights Act of 1866 as a touchstone for many of the arguments he would use in
successfully arguing against the Maryland apprenticeship laws. 192 According to Fuke, Daniel
stated that “[a]ll oppressive bindings are abrogated by the Civil Rights Bill.” 193 However,
because the 1866 Civil Rights Act was not yet in place at the initiation of the Costen case,
Daniel, Stockbridge, and Stirling were forced to rely on common law procedural ground to attack
Costen’s dominion over Washing and Simon.

Nonetheless, according to Fuke, “Daniel’s

[arguments] began to shape Bond’s decisions.” 194
Later in life, William Daniel became a leading proponent of temperance and prohibition.
After helping form the Maryland Temperance Alliance in 1872 (and becoming its President),
Daniel became a leading figure in the prohibition movement. While serving as the chairman of
the National Prohibition Party’s first convention in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, Daniel was
nominated as the Vice-Presidential running mate to John P. St. John of Kansas in 1884.
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As with the other biographies described above, Daniel’s decision to represent LC in
Coston is quite consistent with the depictions available. Daniel seemed resolute in attacking
what he must have perceived to be immoral practices, whether abolitionism or consumption of
alcohol. Ultimately, like the others, Daniel seems to fit perfectly within the historical framework
described.
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visited Nov. 7, 2011).
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